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ABSTRACT
Whilst governments worldwide juggle competing priorities within the context of limited 
budgets, Malaysia has acted to seek more effective ways of building highways. In Malaysia, 
private involvement is allowed for the construction of highways in order to stimulate 
economic activity that is rarely matched elsewhere. This private finance involvement is able 
to reduce the public sector workforce and increase employment opportunities. However, 
most of the private or public/private toll highway project partnerships in the 80s and 90s 
have yet to yield any hard evidence of being successfully profitable, since few of the 
typically 30- to 50-year concession agreements have yet to mature. This paper provides a 
financing appraisal and scenario-based solution to aid private or public decision-making 
to finance highway projects.
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north) to Johor Bahru (in the south). To date, 
it is the largest (and the longest) single toll 
road project in Malaysia, and was originally 
developed in response to traffic saturation 
on Federal Route 1, which runs both north 
and south of Kuala Lumpur (MITI, 2009). 
However, in order to finance the remaining 
sections, the government chose to privatize 
the construction programme, and in 1988, 
the MHA’s role was transferred to the newly-
formed private company “Project Lebuhraya 
Utara-Selatan Berhad” (PLUS Ltd). The 
government’s interest was bolstered by 
INTRODUCTION
Private investment of toll highways in 
Malaysia can be traced back to the late 
1980s (Expressway, 2010). The Malaysian 
Highway Authority (MHA) was originally 
responsible for completing the entire North-
South Expressway, which stretches over 
900 km between Bukit Kayu Hitam (in the 
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their agreement to provide a loan facility, 
if traffic levels were lower than expected, 
during the first 17 years of the concession 
period. Companies like PLUS, Grand Saga 
(Concession Company for the Cheras-
Kajang Highway), Maju Expressway MEX 
(Operator for the KL-Putrajaya Highway), 
Besraya (Operator of the Besraya Highway 
from the Istana Interchange to the UPM 
Interchange), and East Coast Expressway 
ECE (Operator for the Kuala Lumpur-Karak 
Highway), are good examples of those that 
have obtained these benefits to finance their 
toll highway businesses.
This paper provides a financing appraisal 
of the key issues prevalent to the costs 
incurred in building highways. Essentially, 
a good highway network is a prerequisite 
- though by no means a guarantee - of 
positive economic development. In view 
of the strategic role of good highways in 
a country’s economic development and 
the large investment required, a careful 
financing appraisal of these investments 
is crucial. These findings will hopefully 
provide a comprehensive review of all 
aspects of project costs and laydown a 
foundation for the implementation of private 
or public finance involvement. The two main 
objectives of this study are:
 • to improve decision-making using a 
scenario-based solution; and
 • to carry out an appraisal of financial 
issues.
METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION
Before a toll highway is built in a given 
region, it is impossible to calculate the 
influence of tolls on the diversion of traffic 
from existing roads to toll highways due 
to the absence of empirical data. The usual 
approach, in such a situation, is to conduct 
questionnaire surveys amongst potential 
users such as car drivers, truck drivers, 
and large fleets of company cars. In this 
study, data were gathered from feasibility 
studies that had been carried out by a local 
consulting engineering firm in Malaysia. 
However, due to confidentiality, some of the 
data had to be predicted and several issues 
could only be appraised briefly. In addition, 
traffic composition data for 2010 from the 
Roads Branch, Public Works Department of 
Malaysia, were used to predict traffic levels. 
FINANCIAL VIABILITY AND 
FINANCING PROJECT COSTS
Whether tolls are applied to an entire 
network, to a stand-alone highway, or to a 
segment of highway, the most fundamental 
issue is whether the income from the tolls 
will be sufficient to cover the costs of 
building and maintaining the highway. If 
not, the project will be unfeasible from the 
very start. The financial viability structure 
includes:
i. Construction costs – in full or in part. In 
some cases, these may include the cost 
of acquiring the necessary land.
ii. Maintenance costs – including the cost 
of collecting tolls during the toll-bearing 
period of the highway’s existence.
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iii. Financing costs – the costs of raising 
funds to finance the project; principally 
the cost of interest payments.
iv. Profit – will be set at zero for an entirely 
public-financed initiative project, but 
will be required for privately-financed 
or public-private partnership initiative 
projects. Levels to be set during the 
concessionary period.
Additionally, there are various methods 
of financing project cost of a toll highway. 
Referring to the kinds of partnership 
between the public and private sectors in 
toll highway businesses from a financing 
viewpoint, two basic patterns emerged: 
(1) project finance system; and (2) other 
modes of financing. Project finance systems 
are adopted in concessionaire-type public-
private partnership finance initiatives using 
formulas such as Built Operate Transfer 
(BOT), Built Transfer Operate (BTO), 
and Built Lease Transfer (BLT). Project 
finance systems are claimed to be amongst 
the most reliable tools for converting a 
system of inclusive financing, backed by 
the credit-worthiness of the government, 
into a system that allows concessionaires to 
raise funds directly from financial markets 
under conditions of ‘small government’. 
Another mode of financing is the non-
project finance system, where, rather than 
raising finance for the entire project, with 
a view to repaying the investment from 
operating revenue, the concessionaire has 
a contractual arrangement with a separate 
body to whom it would sell the completed 
highway.
Similarly, a financial feasibility study 
is carried out to estimate cash flow. This 
analysis aims to obtain the financial rate 
of return and the methods employed are 
similar, where a discount rate is calculated to 
equalize the net present values of expenditure 
and income. Expenditure is comprised of 
construction costs, right-of-way acquisition 
costs, maintenance and operating costs, fund 
raising costs, and interest. In this study, the 
capital value method is used, by referring to 
the variant of “Net Present Value” (NPV). 
In the NPV variant, the forecast expenditure 
is discounted to be present at that time. 
According to the capital value method, 
the project is recommended; if it shows a 
positive capital value, in the case of the net 
present value variant, a “value greater than 
null (NPV value > 0); and in the final value 
variant, a ‘value greater than a horizon value 
of the alternative capital investment (Sheila, 
1994).
TRAFFIC VOLUME FORECASTING 
FOR TOLL HIGHWAYS
Traffic volume forecasts are the most 
fundamental data during the financial 
analysis of a highway, from the planning 
stage onwards.  They influence the 
fundamental decision of whether the 
highway should be a toll highway or not; 
and later, they influence decisions of setting 
and adjusting toll levels during a collection 
period. In Malaysia, when a large-scale toll 
highway is planned, the financial institutions 
investing in them usually conduct their own 
traffic volume surveys to verify the would-
be concessionaire’s forecast. In this study, 
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the forecast takes into account recent traffic-
growth. This was obtained after applying 
the growth rates of 5% for 2000 to 2010 
and 4.0% for 2010 to 2025 to the base year 
2000. Meanwhile, traffic volumes were 
obtained from the JKR’s Road Traffic Model 
of 2009 (Ministry of Works Malaysia, 
2009). Meanwhile, traffic forecasting was 
extrapolated from the previous trends based 
on the traffic model for the Seremban - 
Kuala Lumpur expressway. This figure 
was based on the available traffic records 
between the 1995 and 2005 (Department of 
Statistics, 2009). It was predicted that traffic 
on the new highway would come from two 
sources: 1) traffic diverted from existing 
roads, and 2) traffic generated by reduced 
transport costs.
The average daily traffic on the old 
road was 60,000 vehicles. During the next 
20 years, i.e. before the completion of the 
new highway, passenger car traffic was 
estimated to increase by 5% between 2000 
and 2010 and by 4.0% between 2012 and 
2020 (Department of Statistics, 2009). This 
forecast took into account traffic growth 
and the number of completed highways 
since 2010. However, in this study, it was 
assumed that 92% of the existing traffic 
would divert to the new highway, whilst 
the other 8% remained as local traffic. This 
increase in traffic was allowed for after 20 
years, because at that time, the highway’s 
capacity was expected to reach 260,000 
vehicles (Department of Statistics, 2009).
Similarly, reduced transport costs 
on the new highway were also expected 
to generate new traffic. Based on traffic 
trends (Ministry of Works, Malaysia, 2010) 
between Kuala Lumpur and Seremban, 
with the expressway’s generated traffic was 
estimated to increase by 10% of the traffic 
diverted from the existing roads during the 
first year after completion. This would be 
followed by 15% during the fifth year, and 
another 15% during the tenth year. The 
traffic forecast between 2000 and 2030 is 
shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1 
Forecast of daily traffic on the highway between 2000 and 20301
Year Diverted from existing roads Generated traffic Passenger Car Unit/Day
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
100,000
111,500
124,000
148,000
161,500
193,500
245,000
 9,500
16,000
24,000
26,500
29,000
33,500
38,000
109,500
127,500
148,500
164,500
180,500
201,500
252,500
Source: The Ministry of Works, Malaysia (2010)
1Based on Road Traffic Volume Malaysia 2010, by Highway Planning Unit Ministry of Works Malaysia
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OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT
Upon project completion, the concession 
company is required to maintain and operate 
the new highway. The following recurrent 
costs are expected (Sidney, 1995):
 • Operation costs - wages, salaries, and 
utility bills.
 • Building and equipment maintenance.
 • Pavement resurfacing and heavy repairs.
 • Transportation and depreciation charges.
Annual operation and maintenance costs 
for the highway were estimated at RM25 
million for the entire project. However, 
at least 30% of the maintenance costs are 
accounted for by foreign exchange and 
interest rates, which overshadow the actual 
economic cost for annual maintenance. This 
cost is assumed to increase gradually with 
the growth of traffic, until the year 2025. 
Additionally, major repaving is needed 
every sixth year, at an estimated cost of 
RM30 million. Nevertheless, maintenance 
and operation costs are estimated for 25 
years only - the economic life of the project 
- assuming that the concession period is 30 
years.
TABLE 2 
Estimated Capital Funding (in millions of Ringgit Malaysia, RM)1
Conditions of site Length for the entire 25km of highways
Cost Per Km. 
(million)
Cost Over 
Distance (million)
Site 1:
New site area
Construction of a new 10km dual three-lane 
elevated expressway. The route is assumed to 
be running along the mangrove swamps, peat 
soil area, or river banks, and partially enter the 
existing State Road to link the North-South 
Highway at any existing interchange.
30.6 306
Site 2:
Within city 
vicinity
Construction of a 15km dual three-lane 
road, consisting of existing and new roads. 
The new city ring-road forms part of the 
circumferential route around the hub of the 
new town centre.
34.2 513
Contingency 10% 78
Cost of Land Acquisition and Property Acquisition 198 
Cost of Project Management and Consultancy, Soil Investigation, and Preliminary 
Site Survey (15%) 134 
Total Capital Cost 1,229 
1Estimated costs based on the Project Lebuhraya Utara-Selatan’s (PLUS) Design, Build, Operate, and 
Transfer (DBOT), from 1988 to present.
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MULTI-CRITERIA ANALYSIS
Evaluation of toll highway projects may 
be roughly classified into those that are 
carried out before and after the road is 
opened. Benefits may include: (1) reduced 
vehicle operating costs on the new highway 
for traffic diverted from old roads, and 
generated traffic; (2) vehicle operating costs 
for the traffic remaining on old roads; and 
(3) time saved for passengers and freight 
(PwC, 2010).
Most benefits are estimated in terms 
of the traffic volume diverting from the 
existing roads to the newly proposed 
highway. Naturally, it is assumed that 
diverted traffic is able to enjoy all benefits, 
which are calculated in terms of cash as 
follows:
1. Traffic diverted from old roads:
As indicated, the average daily traffic on the 
highway will reach about 109,500 vehicles 
in year three. One reason for this is that the 
travel time on the new and shorter highway 
has been reduced to 15 minutes for cars 
and about half an hour for trucks and buses. 
Results of studies on vehicle operations for 
the existing roads and the newly proposed 
highway indicating costs per vehicle-km are 
shown in Table 3.
The benefits of this diverted traffic in 
year three are shown in Table 4. The unit 
benefits for the traffic diverted from the 
existing road is RM 0.80 per car-km. The 
traffic gain by distance would be 1km less 
(i.e., the length of the old road is 26km 
and the proposed highway is 25km). Table 
4 shows that the total benefits for traffic 
diverted is RM815.34 million. Benefits due 
to the shorter distance is RM175.86 (21.6%) 
and RM639.5 million (78.4%) by improved 
highway design standards.
2. Generated Traffic
For generated traffic (see Table 5). The 
unit benefit is estimated to be one-half of 
that used for traffic diverted from the old 
road. The benefit generated from traffic 
level is due to the increased reduction of 
maintenance costs.
TABLE 3 
Vehicle operating costs on old roads and the newly proposed highway (in Ringgit Malaysia)1
Cost item Vehicle
Old Road Proposed Highway
Fuel and oil
Tyre wear
Depreciation
Interest
Maintenance
1.50
0.50
0.80
0.60
1.00
1.20
0.40
0.70
0.50
0.80
Total 4.40 3.60
Benefit 4.40 - 3.60 = RM 0.80 per car-km.
1Estimated cost is based on the Project Lebuhraya Utara-Selatan’s (PLUS) Design, Build, Operate, and 
Transfer (DBOT), and the Rehabilitate, Operate, and Transfer (ROT) business model.
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3. Reduced Vehicle Operating Costs 
(VOC) on the Old Road 
The diversion of 92% of the traffic to 
the new highway is expected to reduce 
congestion on the existing road; and thus, 
benefits the remaining traffic. In year three, 
it is predicted that a total of 11,000 vehicles 
less will use the old road daily. As a result, 
a 5% reduction in vehicle operation costs is 
expected. The benefit in year three will be:
11,000 cars X 25 kilometres X 365 days 
X RM 0.20 
= RM 20.07 million
4. Benefit from the reduction in time for 
a car
The time saved for vehicles, passengers, 
and freight operators using the highway, 
contributes to approximately 5% of the total 
benefit. The estimated time-saving value 
per passenger is RM 1.00 an hour per car 
and RM 2.75 an hour per freight vehicle. 
Assuming the economic life of a car is 4000 
hours and the value per/hr. of car is RM100; 
the cost of delays for cars in year three 
(2003) is equivalent to 109,500 x 365 x 1 
x 0.25) / 4000x100. The total benefit from 
the reduction in time in year three for cars 
is therefore RM 8.03 million.
TABLE 4 
Benefits for traffic diverted from the old road in year three (millions of Ringgit Malaysia)
Traffic variable and vehicle Calculation Benefits
Shorter distance (Car)
Highway design standards (Car)
109,500 cars X 5 km. x 365 days X RM 4.40
109,500 cars X 20 km x 365 days X RM 0.80
175.86
639.48
Total 815.34
TABLE 5 
Benefit for the generated traffic in year three (in Ringgit Malaysia, RM)
Traffic variable and vehicle Calculation Benefits
Shorter distance (Car)
Highway design standards (Car)
5,700 cars X 5 km. X 365 days X RM 2.20
3,800 cars X 20 km. X 365 days X RM 0.40
22.89
11.10
Total vehicles (5700+3,800=9500) 33.99
TABLE 6 
Reduction in time (in Ringgit Malaysia, RM)
Year
(No. vehicles) X (days) X (reduction in time ÷ economic lifetime)
X (value per hour) X (years)
Benefits
2004-2005
2006-2010
2011-2015
2016-2020
2021-2025
118,500 cars x 365 days x 1 yr. x 0.25 hr. ÷4000 x RM100 x 2
138,000 cars x 365 days x 5yrs x 0.25 hr. ÷4000 x RM100 x 2
156,000 cars x 365 days x 5yrs x 0.25 hr. ÷4000 x RM100 x 2
172,000 cars x 365 days x 5yrs x 0.25 hr. ÷4000 x RM100 x 2
191,000 cars x 365 days x 5yrs x 0.25 hr. ÷4000 x RM100 x 2
0.54
1.57
1.78
1.96
2.18
TOTAL 8.03
Mazlan Hassan and Abdul Razak Ibrahim
140 Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 21 (S): 133 - 148 (2013)
5. Toll Rate and Revenue
The toll rate for new highways is based on 
the North-South Expressway’s toll charges. 
The 2000 rate-schedule of RM 0.06 per km 
for cars increased by 30% in 2005, and this 
was by a further 20% in 2010. The current 
toll rate for passenger cars using the North 
- South Expressway (operated by PLUS) is 
RM0.12 per km. The subsequent revenue is 
forecast from the traffic modelling results. 
In theory, the revenue obtained in this way 
provides a valuable source of funds for 
highway maintenance planning, upgrading, 
and future expansion.
COSTS AND BENEFITS ANALYSIS
The benefits of the proposed highway 
exceed its costs - both discounted at 12% 
- by about RM469.3 million, during its 
economic life. Meanwhile, a cost:benefit 
ratio of almost 1:1.39 indicates that the 
project is well justified.
As the project has a high net worth, it is 
not particularly sensitive to changes in any 
single factor. For example, if the capital cost 
of the project is 25% higher than estimated, 
the net present value of the project is 
RM199.5 million. The switching value for 
capital costs, that is to which this cost can 
rise, so that the NPV of the project becomes 
zero, is approximately 43%. However, traffic 
forecasts are inherently more speculative. In 
this study, approximately 90% of the benefit 
arose from traffic diverted from the old road. 
If the initial traffic diversion to the proposed 
highway (or the rate of traffic growth) is less 
than estimated (so that the benefit is 25% 
lower), the NPV would be reduced from 
RM469.3 million to approximately negative 
RM145.4 million, which is still substantial. 
The switching value for the benefits is 
approximately 36%.
If the project capital cost is 25% higher, 
and the benefit is 25% lower than estimated, 
the project’s NPV is still RM54.1 million; 
and the rate of return still exceeds 12%. 
Under these circumstances, the project is 
still well-justified.
Table 8 shows that NPV in revenue 
exceeds NPV in costs by negative (-ve) 
RM239.6 million over a period of 22 
years. This means the existing toll rate is 
insufficient; unless capital costs are reduced 
by at least 25%. However, the revenue is 
very much affected by traffic levels, which 
have been forecast to increase between 4 
TABLE 7 
Calculated revenue, based on traffic volume with a fixed toll rate (in Ringgit Malaysia, RM)
Year Average No. of vehicles daily
Revenue collected from tolls during this period
(No. of vehicles x days x years x toll rate) 
2004-2005
2006-2010
2011-2015
2016-2020
2021-2025
118,500
138,000 
156,000 
172,000
191,000
118,000 x 365 x 2 x 3.00 = 258,420,000
138,000 x 365 x 5 x 3.00 = 755,600,000
156,500 x 365 x 5 x 3.00 = 856,800,000
172,000 x 365 x 5 x 3.00 = 944,400,000
191,000 x 365 x 5 x 3.00 = 1,045,800,000
TOTAL RM 3, 861, 440, 000
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to 5% annually. An increase of 4 to 5% is 
indeed a very low percentage for a country 
like Malaysia, where economic growth is 
between 5 to 8%. Hence, it is more sensible 
to forecast increased traffic levels between 
10 and 12% annually. In other words, the 
revenue will rise by almost double, i.e. from 
RM969.80 million to RM 2000 million. The 
project will certainly now be well-justified 
with these newly forecasted traffic levels.
However, operating costs are expected 
to rise gradually alongside the growth of 
traffic. Furthermore, recurrent costs are 
estimated to increase by approximately 10% 
annually. In addition, there is a possibility 
of salary increases because of the shadow 
price for labour, which is likely to increase 
over time. However, in calculating NPV for 
costs and revenue, the increase in toll rate 
during the concession period was neglected. 
The reason for this was to see to what extend 
the present toll rate could be used to sustain 
profitable operations, should there be no 
future rise in toll charges in; though in 
reality, toll rates would definitely increase.
Scenario-based solutions between 
public, public-private partnership, and the 
private finance initiative are:
There are three scenarios (AASHTO, 2011):
 • Public finance initiative – no toll charges 
being imposed.
 • Public-private partnership initiative - toll 
charges are decided by the government.
 • Private finance initiative – toll charges 
are decided by private investors.
SCENARIO 1: PUBLIC FINANCE 
INITIATIVE 
The capital cost is estimated to be RM1229 
million. Maintenance and operating costs 
are estimated at RM10.6 million annually, 
with an additional cost of RM20 million 
every sixth year for major repaving works. 
Since the project will be carried out solely 
by the government, it is expected that the 
interest rate will be very low. Hence, a 
discounted rate of 12% was adopted. Project 
TABLE 8 
A comparison of the associated costs and revenue (in Ringgit Malaysia, RM; million)
Concession period Associated costs
Total 
costs
Toll revenue
Net Present Value
discounted at 12%
Year
(1)
Period
(2)
Capital 
Costs (3)
Recurrent 
Costs (4)
Total Cost 
(5)
Benefits
(6)
Costs
(7)
Benefits
(8)
0
1
2
3-4
4--10
11-15
16-20
21-2
2000
2001
2002
2003-2004
2004-2010
1011-2015
2016-2020
2021-2024
410
600
220
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
21.4
77.0
82.4
68.4
95.0
410.0
610.
220.0
21.4
77.0
82.4
68.4
95.0
0
0
0
258.84
755.60
856.80
944.40
1045.8
410.0
535.7
175.4
14.50
34.10
19.20
10.00
8.30
0
0
0
184.20
341.80
219.92
137.54
86.42
Total 1209.4 969.80
Note: Net Present Value equals -ve RM239.6 million; this is the difference between columns 8 & 7
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costs have to be reasonable since no toll 
would be imposed on the user. Therefore, 
the budget must be monitored closely to 
ensure that the costs do not exceed the 
benefits (World Economic Forum, 2011).
Expected cost-effectiveness results
i. Project Net Present Value (NPV) = 
RM469.3 million
ii. Project Cost : Benefit Ratio: 1: 1.39
iii. If the capital cost of the project is 25% 
higher than estimated, the NPV of the 
project is still RM195.5 million.
iv. The switching value for capital cost so 
that the NPV of the project becomes 
zero, is approximately 43%.
v. If the benefits are 25% lower, the NPV 
is reduced from RM469.3 million to 
approximately RM145.4. The switching 
value for benefits is approximately 36%.
vi. If the project capital cost is 26% higher 
and the benefits are 25% lower than 
estimated, the project NPV is RM54.1 
million, which is still well justified.
The project has a high net worth, and 
it is not particularly sensitive to changes 
in any single factor (World Economic 
Forum, 2010). Apart from this, the project 
is well-justified (even though no toll will be 
imposed on the user). The benefits gained 
from a reduction in vehicle operating costs, 
which exceed the project costs, prove that 
the project is viable (PcW, September 2010). 
However, the discounted rate must be within 
12% for the project to be justified. This 
should not be a problem as the government 
normally obtains its funds through taxation 
or from bank loans, at below-market rates. 
Furthermore, funds obtained from foreign 
aid sources frequently carry interest rates 
substantially below the opportunity cost of 
capital; especially for developing countries 
(World Economic Forum, 2011).
SCENARIO 2: PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIP FINANCE 
INITIATIVE 
This scheme is jointly funded by public and 
private initiatives using the Built Transfer 
and Operate (BTO) concept. Since public 
funds are involved, the capital cost in the 
partnership scheme will normally increase 
by 25% from the estimated cost of RM1230 
million to a new value of RM1537.5 million. 
Support such investment funds will be 
made available to the private sector at 
rates below the current interest rate. This 
is guaranteed by the government. As a 
result, the discounted rate (which is a major 
determinant of the cost-benefit comparison) 
is set at 12%. The government has a say in 
deciding toll rates, and therefore, they can 
be fixed at RM 3.00 per 25km (or RM 0.12 
per km). The revenue collected from toll 
charges is shared with the concessionaire 
at a ratio of 40/60 for the first year, 50/50 
for the second year, 60/40 for the third year, 
and so on, until the end of the concession 
period. The ownership rights of the highway, 
and all ancillary structures, revert back to 
the government after the concession period 
has expired.
Expected cost effectiveness results
i. The Net Present Value (NPV) of the 
project, at a discounted rate of 12% 
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= RM 1159.5 million, and at a 20% 
discounted rate = negative (-) RM 83.4 
million
ii. Project Cost : Benefit ratio = 1: 1.78 
iii. If the capital cost of the project is 25% 
higher than estimated, then the NPV 
capital cost at12% is RM816.3 million
iv. Switching value for capital cost, that 
is the extent to which these costs can 
rise, so that the Net Present Worth of 
the project becomes zero, is deemed to 
be 84%
v. If the toll rate is reduced so that the 
benefits are 25% lower, the NPV capital 
cost becomes RM497.0 million and the 
switching value for benefits is 43%.
vi. If the capital costs are 25% higher and 
the benefits are 25% less than estimated, 
the Net Present Worth of the project is 
equal to RM153.8 million
In other words, an increase in the capital 
cost brings a positive NPV value; in terms 
of costs versus benefits. Toll rates that are 
setup by the government are high enough to 
increase the total net worth benefits, even 
though the capital costs have increased by 
25%. Nevertheless, should the discounted 
rate be set at 20%, the costs will exceed 
the benefits, which indirectly shows us 
that without the government’s support 
in giving low interest rates, the project 
will not be justified. In addition, in BTO 
projects, the private sector normally wishes 
to recover the investment capital as soon 
as possible (Eddington Transport Study, 
2006). For instance, the completion of the 
Second Expressway System BTO project in 
Bangkok ended in a disaster for Kumagai 
Gumi. One source indicated that the Thai 
government seized the expressway’s assets 
over a dispute in the amount of toll to be 
levied (PwC, June 2010).
SCENARIO 3: PRIVATE FINANCE 
INITIATIVE
Projects funded by private initiatives may 
reduce capital costs by a substantial amount 
(PwC, April, 2011). Normally, a shorter time 
is needed to complete such a project. With 
a skilled workforce and longer working-
time, the duration to complete a project is 
shortened; therefore, the overhead expenses 
are reduced. Capital cost decreases to as low 
as 25 % from the estimated costs. As a result, 
the maintenance and operating costs are also 
reduced by approximately 20%. However, 
since money has to be borrowed from banks, 
the interest rate for the borrowed capital is 
much higher. In this setup, it is assumed 
that the project will not get any help from 
the government. Therefore, in order to 
recover the investment capital, the private 
consortium must set the toll-rate to recover 
the project’s costs within 30 years.
Expected cost-effectiveness results
i. Project Net Present Value at a discounted 
rate of 20% = RM334.7 million
ii. The Cost : Benefit Ratio is 1: 1.40
iii. If the capital cost of the project is 25% 
higher than estimated, then the new 
NPV project cost will stand at 43%.
iv. If the toll rate is increased so that the 
benefits are 25% higher, then the NPV 
of the project will now be 188%.
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v. If the capital cost is 25% higher and 
the benefits are also 25% higher than 
estimated, the NPV of the project is 
equal to RM448.75 million.
The toll rate proposed in Scenario 
3 is 20% lower than that of Scenarios 
1 and 2, i.e., reduced from RM0.12 per 
km to RM 0.096 per km. However, the 
discounted rate is higher at 20%. This is 
because the concession company has to 
bear all of the costs of construction and 
related risks. Despite this drawback, the 
concession company is still able to make 
substantial returns, with a profitable net 
worth of RM334.7 million. This is most 
likely attributed to the significant reduction 
in capital and maintenance costs to as low 
as 25% and 29%, respectively. In order for 
the above conditions to be met, the project 
must be completed within a stipulated 
period of time. The works programmed 
must be strictly adhered to in order to 
avoid additional costs. This schedule can be 
built by a private sector that has extensive 
experience and a skilled workforce. The 
most important conclusion to draw here is 
that the private sector is able to operate the 
proposed expressway profitably, even at a 
lower toll rate. If toll revenue is collected 
based on a rate of RM0.096 per km, the 
concession company will only be able to 
recover their initial capital costs after 14 
years of operation. Therefore, the estimation 
of project costs must be accurate as it has a 
significant impact on the overall end-return 
of the revenue collected. In a way, this 
scheme is more cost-effective and attractive 
than the one presented in Scenarios 1 and 2, 
with regards to the following:
 • A lower toll rate that will benefit both 
the users and the government.
 • The project is fully financed by the 
concession company.
 • There is still a good return, even with a 
higher loan interest rate.
HIGHWAY INVESTMENT AND 
BENEFITS TO ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT
Highway projects must be evaluated in a 
greater context of the nation’s economic 
development.  Whether the funding 
structure is financed by the public or 
private sector, a good highway improves 
business efficiency through time savings 
and lower operating costs. It also increases 
employment opportunities by providing 
market flexibility and job accessibility. An 
enhanced transportation infrastructure also 
fosters competition by providing easier 
access to new markets. Additionally, good 
highway networks attract international 
trade and investment and subsequently 
increase domestic mobile activities. 
Through guidance from these benefits, 
the government should be able to set 
infrastructure investment policies and social 
considerations, to aid highway investment 
decision-making.
CONCLUSION
Toll highways in Malaysia have been 
privatised since 1988. Except for two that 
are directly run by government corporations 
and one by the city of Kuala Lumpur 
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itself, all are run privately under BOT 
concession systems. The 847.7 km North 
South highway, the 48 km central link to 
the North South highway, and five other 
highways totalling 149.9 km were run 
by concessionaires, as of 31 December 
1997. Projek Lebuhraya Utara-Selatan 
Bhd. (PLUS) holds exclusive concession 
rights to the North South highway. This 
massive concessionaire and several smaller 
concessionaires run the toll highways in 
Malaysia, giving us a similar situation to 
that of Italy.
All toll highways are managed by 
Malaysia Highway Authority (MHA). MHA 
initially started as a toll highway operator. 
After undergoing an organizational change, 
under the national policy to privatise all 
toll highways, it now undertakes land 
expropriation and supervises concessions 
from planning through to construction, 
whilst forming and evaluating related 
technical standards.
Financial analysis indicates that capital 
costs are high. The forecasted traffic levels 
are low, if the calculation is based on a 4 
to 5% growth. The growth of the number 
of vehicles in Malaysia has to be around 
10 to 12% for the returns to be good over 
a relatively long period of time. Even 
though financial returns are generally good, 
investment in highway projects is still 
considered to be high risk, and thus, giving 
investors many unforeseen circumstances 
(High, 2008). Since revenue depends greatly 
on forecasted traffic levels, it is likely that 
the government will give guarantees, should 
low levels of traffic not be able to generate 
sufficient revenue to cover operating and 
capital costs. However, under the concession 
agreement, the private operator is free to 
raise toll rates to achieving traffic levels 
above the traffic threshold. On the contrary, 
if the traffic levels fall below the traffic 
threshold and the toll rate is above the toll 
threshold, a penalty will be applied.
Key drivers for the involvement of 
private finance or public-private partnership 
initiatives to build a highway are as follows:
 • E n h a n c e  t h e  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n 
infrastructure, which is desired to 
stimulate economic activity.
 • More convenient and easy access 
nationwide. 
 • Shorter and more predictable journey 
times, reduced wear and tear on motor 
vehicles, and reduced fuel consumption 
by road users.
 • Law enforcement and improved 
road safety benefits like breakdown 
and recovery assistance, ambulance 
services, customers call centres, etc.
In summary, no matter what the reasons 
are, highway investment policy in Malaysia 
has to take into account long-term economic, 
social, and environmental implications.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
I n  M a l a y s i a ,  m o s t  t o l l  h i g h w a y 
c o n c e s s i o n a i r e s  a r e  s e m i - p u b l i c 
organizations, with 100% private companies 
being the second most common form. 
Despi te  their  name,  “semi-public” 
companies are seldom owned 50/50 by 
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the government and other private interests. 
They are either primarily government or 
private. Malaysia has a vast experience in 
toll highway operations and out of necessity, 
it has undergone several reorganizations of 
its concessionaires. A major reason for this 
is that the business environment for each 
toll highway is unique (this includes traffic 
flow and construction costs) and profitability 
varies widely.
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